"The Orbán model — nationalist, EU-skeptic, soft on Moscow — had been watched closely by political movements across the West as a template for durable illiberal governance."

The word "template" is doing a lot of work there. When a governance model gets studied and copied, the policy details travel with it — including the ones about civilian disarmament and centralized control over who gets to own what.

"Hungary's rules require a two-thirds supermajority for constitutional changes — the same threshold Orbán once held, and used."

That last part is the whole story in seven words. Orbán built his lock using the exact same rules Magyar now needs to dismantle it. If you've ever watched a state legislature use procedural thresholds to block or ram through firearms legislation, you already understand exactly how this plays out.

For those of us who watch how constitutional frameworks protect — or fail to protect — individual rights, the Hungarian situation is worth tracking. Magyar won a mandate. Whether he has the votes to act on it is a different question entirely, and the gap between those two things is where rights either get restored or quietly disappear into procedural gridlock.

Have you ever watched a rights-related bill die — or pass — not because of the vote count but because of the procedural threshold required? State level, federal, doesn't matter — curious whether anyone's seen that two-thirds rule used as a shield or a weapon in a context closer to home.

Read the full article in The Handbook → | By Steve Duskett